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I. THE NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING SOVIET THINKING
The imperfect nature of diplomatic relationships
requires nations to assume that a military backup to those
relationships will be a necessity in the future. As
Frederick the Great of Prussia put it, "Diplomacy without
armaments is like music without instruments." [Ref. l:p.
108]
Given the distaste that Americans have for large
standing armies, it can be expected that U.S. armed forces
will remain relatively weak in terms of their capability to
engage in sudden, worldwide combat. This means that a great
deal of foresight will be required to use existing forces in
an effective manner. A policy of "know thine enemy" is
therefore a prudent one.
This thesis presents a method of estimating the concerns
of Soviet decisionmakers through evaluation of Soviet
publications. Source documents were drawn from a single,
regularly-published journal, and references to topics
thought to be of concern to Soviet military writers were
recorded as they occurred over a 36-month period.
This method differs from other techniques of content
analysis in that references to specific topics are measured
and recorded in binary form. This technique allows a larger
body of material to be researched in a given time, and
prevents a small number of articles emphasizing a single
topic to detract from a general trend of editorial interest.
Another difference is that, recognizing the difficulties
inherent in working with translated documents, themes,
rather than strict mechanical word counts, were utilized. A
wide variety of possible terms were selected for initial
data collection, allowing both discrete categorization and
combination of similar themes. For example, Germany can be
evaluated by references to the Federal Republic of Germany,
the German Democratic Republic, Fascist Germany, or
Hitler(ites)
.
Since a methodology was being tested, source materials
were limited to unclassified publications. However, it will
be shown that this methodology could be applied to other
types of publications and levels of data, as long as certain
criteria are met.
Although data analysis was done on a mainframe computer,
the techniques used for data processing could be applied to
microcomputers using appropriate software. The algorithm of
a specially-designed data entry program, as well as the
source code for use on an IBM 370 computer, have been
included .
Data are presented in graphic form. Although only a
limited number of topics are described in detail, appendices
provide the results of all research done in support of this
investigation .
A. THE NEED FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN PEACETIME
Military doctrine, in the Soviet sense, is the
preparation for future war [Ref. 2:p. 38]. An understanding
of that doctrine would allow U.S. planners to anticipate how
the Soviets might undertake military action against American
interests and to prepare for such actions, just as Soviet
military doctrine envisages preparations against enemies of
the Soviet state .
Such early preparation would obviously be advantageous
to either side, particularly in view of modern technology
which calls for specialized platforms, and the long lead
times required for constructing these platforms. Modern
warfighting techniques have shortened the reaction time for
preparation for war, a fact which has been well known since
the introduction of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.
Sokolovskiy pointed this out in the 1962 edition of Soviet
Military Strategy ( Voyennaya Strategia ) , where he states,
"The possibility of a surprise attack by an aggressor
making mass use of nuclear weapons immeasurably increases
the requirements of constant combat readiness of the Armed
Forces. At the present time the bringing of troops into
combat readiness must be measured not by days and in a
number of cases even by hours. For many units and forma-
tions it is now a matter of minutes." [Ref. 3:p. 204]
While modern air transport, such as that available via
the Military Airlift Command and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF) [Ref. 4] may help somewhat in the positioning of what
standing forces there are, the opposite side of this
double-edged sword enables an opponent to insert forces into
an area much more rapidly, as might be done by Soviet
Military Transport Aviation forces [Ref. 5:p. 117]. This
rapid movement of existing forces reduces the ability of
powers to counter another nation's military power through
mobilization. It is this ability to mobilize which is the
basis of NATO's minimal standing forces.
However, examination of modern weapon systems reveals
the inadequacies of a doctrine dependent on mobilization,
due to the difficulties of developing and producing ships
and aircraft. The F-15 Eagle, now the frontline air
superiority fighter in the U.S. Air Force inventory, took
seven years from inception to flight of the first prototype.
Its first operational delivery was two years later [Ref.
6:p. 403]. Similarly, a ship already in production, like
the Navy's FFG-7, takes 28 months from the laying of the
keel to become operational. [Ref. 7:p. 678]
B. METHODS OF PREDICTING SOVIET ACTIONS
Currently, national-level advice on threats and
scenarios is provided to the National Command Authority
through National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). These
documents provide a view of situations which is a compromise
of the views of the various concerned intelligence agencies.
As might be expected, this composite view tends to produce
an outlook brighter than that derived by the military
intelligence agencies. Rather than merely modifying the
military's "worst-case" philosophy, however, the National
Intelligence Estimates consistently tend to overstate the
U.S. advantage, in part because they fail to include
historical, social, and political factors behind Soviet
actions . [ Ref . 8
]
This record of inaccuracy of NIEs was documented by Dr.
Alfred Wohlstetter in his 1974 study "Legends of the
Strategic Arms Race, Part I: The Driving Engine" [Ref. 9:p.
11], where he points out a very strong tendency to
underestimate Soviet capabilities. In describing the
"missile gap" of the early 1960s, Dr. Wohlstetter points out
the problems of estimating Soviet capabilities as only a
threat to the United States:
"First, the 'missile gap,' a brief period in which the
Soviets were expected to but did not deploy ICBMs more
rapidly than we did, was an ICBM gap rather than a general
missile gap. During the same period, in fact, we
regularly and greatly underestimated the number of
intermediate and medium range ballistic missile (IR/MRBM)
launchers that the Russians would deploy at the end of the
1950s and in the early 1960s. For example, our
underestimate of the number of IR and MRBM launchers that
the Russians would deploy by 1963 roughly offset our
overestimate of the number of ICBM launchers they would
deploy. In short, we misunderstood or reversed the
priorities the Russians assigned to getting capabilities
against the European as opposed to the North American part
of NATO. This piece of e thnocent rism on our part was
characteristic. We also greatly underestimated Soviet
aircraft systems directed primarily at Europe rather than
ourselves." [Ref. 9:p. 9]
Another approach, one taken in part by the now-famous
"B-Team" assigned by President Ford to analyze Soviet
strategic programs, is to incorporate historical trends in
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evaluating the motivations behind actions. Trend
extrapolation using prior occurrences as an indicator for
future events may be valid if a legitimate cause-effect
relationship can be determined, and if a period of time long
enough to separate secular (long-term) from seasonal or
cyclic patterns is chosen [Ref. 10:p. 478]. Shorter periods
may give erroneous trends due to observations of portions of
cycles or to external stimuli. An examination of the state
of Soviet industry from 1945-1950 shows tremendous growth,
for example, but over the period 1930-1960 the growth is
shown to be only a rees tablishmen t of the average
development, which was interrupted by World War II. [Ref.
11 :p . 81]
While historical trend analysis is best suited to long
periods of time, it must be remembered that the Soviet Union
has a relatively short history. However, as will be shown,
much of Soviet culture and behavior was inherited from the
Russian state which preceeded it.
A last, and unfortunately common, method of estimating
Soviet intentions is to view the U.S.S.R. as a mirror-imaje
of the United States, with the same goals and desires. Th
technique is often seen in analyses by both sides, and
usually stems from a lack of understanding of the long-range
goals of one's opponent. It is quite common in the American
and European peace movements, which assume that the Soviets
have aims identical to their own. Rather than sharing an
11
interest in disarmament, however, the Soviets usually
demonstrate that their concern lies in security. The
cause-effect relationship is misjudged.
The traditional Russian tendency toward isolation from
outsiders has kept much of Soviet teachings, and thus an
understanding of the Soviet people, from the West. Many
Americans are ignorant of Soviet attitudes. Moshe Lewin
correctly states that
"There is astonishment sometimes among people who are
highly competent and master complex realities in other
spheres of life when they are told that 'what makes the
Russians tick' is not some simple mechanism located in the
Politburo, but the country's history, traditions, culture,
economy, social structure, international environment.
Also leadership--in that order, at the end of those big
components, important but a part of a larger institutional
setting, in interplay with groups, classes, and even—yes!
--different ideological approaches." [Ref. 12:p. 6]
Those who do not accept the complexity of the
differences between American and Soviet cultures often are
led to create a mirror-image,
".
. . to delude oneself by saying that all the
patterns in the world are basically the same or that the
differences don't matter or are mere conventions." [Ref.
13:p. 49]
While the Soviet penchant for delusion makes purely
historical analysis difficult for an observer, it can be
used as a means of determining Soviet concerns.
C. AMERICAN VERSUS SOVIET ROOTS
Before attempting to analyze the motivations of any
group of people, one must first have a sense of the history
12
of that group. This is particularly evident when one looks
beneath the surface of modern Sov-iet culture, and observes
the contrasts between American and So viet /Russian history.
America took much of its culture, law, and governmental
procedures from the British. This adoption was initially
complete even to the point that some of the Founding Fathers
made recommendations that George Washington be the first
king of America. He demured, and a different type of
government was instituted.
What was inherited from the British was a legalistic
system with a distaste for monarchy. Russia, at that time,
was a monarchy which had developed separately from the
British system. The Russian system was cloaked in secrecy,
and had distinct classes which had different patterns of
behavior. While the American legal system claimed
application to all citizens, in Russia
".
. . popular law was deeply enmeshed in the fabric of
peasant society and that its special institutions and
customs had no equivalent among other social groups and
often no counterpart in the official and criminal codes."
[Ref. 12:p. 76]
".
. . rural customs were often simply bar bar ic--lynching
thieves, parading unfaithful wives naked through the
village, and much worse; that the cantonal court was a
shambles, its judges were illiterate, drunken, and
corrupt, and its decisions derived not from peasant nores
but from the clerk (pisar
' ) , who simply invented 'customs'
according to his whims . . ." [Ref. 12:p. 77]
Such behavior is distasteful to the American way of
thinking, and may be rejected as the actions of a barbarous
people long past. American students are not taught that
13
such customs were still being practiced late in the last
century, well within living memory of the founders of the
Soviet state.
Another vast difference between the Soviet and American
peoples is in their memories of war. The wars of this
century have been fought away from the continental United
States, but have been brought to Russian and Soviet terri-
tory on a regular basis. The Russo-Japanese War, the
Russo-Finnish War, World War I, the Soviet Civil War, and
the Great Patriotic War all were fought at least in part on
the soil of the Motherland.
The Soviet history of frequent wars was also inherited
from Russian forebearers. As the Russian-born sociologist
Piritim Sorokin found, Russia
"
. . . had experienced only one peaceful quarter of a
century in the previous thousand years; in every other
period of twenty-five years she engaged in at least one
foreign war. Since the year A. D. 901, . . . Russia had
been at war in 46 of every hundred years." [Ref. l:p. 3]
The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union is kept
alive in the minds of Soviet citizens by a multitude of
memorials dedicated to the defenders of the Socialist
Motherland. Literary works describing the exploits of
Soviet heroes abound, and descriptions of operations from
this war abound in Soviet military journals. The Allied
victory is portrayed as primarily a Soviet one, where the
Soviet armed forces fought massive German forces while
American and British troops engaged only weaker forces.
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Memory of the "crimes" of the Nazis is also perpetuated,
modified in some cases from what is known in the West.
As an example, a memorial to the victims of the Katyn
Forest massacre of Polish officers and men was erected at
the site to preserve anti-Nazi sentiments. However, it is
widely accepted in the West that the Poles were killed not
by Nazis, but by the Soviets themselves, to make Polish
reconstruction more difficult [Ref. 14:p. 32].
Such manipulation of history is in keeping with Soviet
style. As Nathan Leites noted in the RAND Corporation
study, The Operational Code of the Politburo
,
"In deciding upon what statements to make both within
the Party and without, the leadership must not be
influenced by considerations of truth. Only the impact of
these statements should be considered. Bourgeois
governments are held to follow the same rule.
"There are occasions when falsehoods--which are





Under Josef Stalin revision of history became a
standard means of dealing with associates who had fallen
from favor, and contributed to Stalin's "cult of
personality." Roy Medvedev, a Soviet dissident still living
in Moscow, states that
"The deification of Stalin, the creation of stories
about his infallibility and omniscience, generated a
quasi-religious perception of reality in the scholarly
community. The truth was not what corresponded to facts,
to empirical research, but what Comrade Stalin had
declared to be true. Quotations from 'the classics of
Marxism-Leninism,' and above all from the newly canonized
classics of Stalin, became the main proof that a given
position was true. Inconvenient facts were juggled,
distorted, or simply ignored." [Ref. 16:p. 499]
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This revision of history has continued, and has gone so
far as to include the United States as a supporter of and
collaborator with the Nazis. A Soviet military dictionary
refers to foreign special forces ( spetsial j nyye voyska ) as
"Special units and formations of the armed forces of the
USA and other imperialist states . . . Among them are
traitors who have deserted socialist countries, who
collaborated with Hitlerites and have found asylum with
the American militarists." [Ref 17:p. 205]
This quotation points out another factor which must be
contended with when dealing with Soviet or Russian writings,
that of a symbolic style which is applied to factual
material as well as fiction.
The founder of the Soviet state, Vladimir Il'ich Lenin,
complained of how his fellow believers had to circumvent the
Tsar's censorship by use of "that cursed Aesopean language"
[Ref. 18:p. 7]. This style of writing, in which situations
are described as allusions to the writer's actual feelings,
was not merely a Bolshevik invention designed to avoid
persecution, but rather was common in Russian times and can
still be found in contemporary Soviet writings. Stories
told through Aesopean language may describe situations which
seem very real, but which in fact describe a much broader
reality .
A case in point is Alexander Solzheni tsyn ' s One Day in
the Life of Ivan Denisovich [Ref. 19]. On the surface, this
story describes the daily activity of a laborer in a Soviet
prison camp during the reign of Stalin. However, to the
16
intended readers, it was a damnation of the entire Soviet
system. The words themselves do not carry the message, but
the descriptions they form do.
The lack of objective truth in some current Soviet
writings can be interpreted as an extension of Aesopean
language. Situations are described as the Soviets perceive
them, or would like others to perceive them, rather than as
they are. Thus Americans can be described as Hitlerite
collaborators not because they supported the Third Reich,
but because Americans are believed to be a threat to Soviet
security, a threat reminiscent of the Nazi invasion.
In another method of applying Aesopean language, stories
from the past are used to indicate current concerns. In
this regard the stories are a manipulative training tool,
intended to arouse the reader's emotions of past hatred and
to tie this to a current enemy. For this reason, the
relative frequency with which certain topics are discussed
over time can be used as a measure of the concern of
policymakers
.
Throughout any analysis of Soviet writing, rather than
taking Soviet statements at face value, one must look for
the meaning behind the reason something was said initially.
Even discounting the difficulties of working in a foreign
language, or with translations (which is no small
dismissal!), a hard analysis of literal statements can be
very misleading to the reader if the context of the
17
statements is not appreciated. Given the proper considera-
tion of context as well as content, the concerns of authors
can be derived from their writings. Given also the strict
control that the Communist Party exercises over publications
in the Soviet Union, those writings which are published will
portray a well-studied official view, and thus may be used
to derive the true feelings behind their release.
Once the analyst is aware of the differences between
Soviet and American motivations, of the way that messages
can be transmitted, and of the control that authorities have
over published materials, it is evident that the Soviet
system is not a mirror-image of the American one. By
measuring the output of this different system, though, the
analyst should be able to estimate what the Soviet authors
and editors wished to have understood.
II. EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET CONTROL OVER LITERATURE
Once the differences between Soviet and American styles
of writing have been recognized, it remains the job of the
analyst to make some use of these differences. Recognizing
that falsification, allusion, and selective omission are
common traits of such writing, the trends revealed by
observation of topical references over time should give
light to the thoughts of the originators of these writings.
To test the hypothesis that Soviet concerns are
transmitted to readers by using less-than-explici t means, an
analysis of an unclassified military journal was conducted.
A. THE NATURE OF MORSKOY SBORNIK
As with all official Soviet publications, the content of
Morskoy Sbornik ( Naval Selections , also referred to as the
Soviet Naval Digest ) is highly controlled. Since high-level
approval is required for publication, examination of its
subject matter should give an insight as to the concerns of
its editors .
Morskoy Sbornik is one of several journals published by
Voyenizdat, the Soviet Military Publishing House. Voyeniz-
dat is subject to direction by the Main Political Adminis-
tration (MPA) of the Soviet Army and Navy. The MPA receives
its instructions from the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). [Ref. 2:p. 288]
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Thus Morskoy Sbornik is actually a channel for doctrine
(in the American sense of the word) from the Party leader-
ship to a select group. This dictation is by no means
insidious— the role of the Party is quite overt. As the
1971 edition of the Soviet Officer ' s Handbook states,
"Leadership of the Communist Party and reinforcement of the
role and influence of the Party organizations in the Armed
Forces, which is emphasized in the Program of the CPSU, is
the basic principle of Soviet military development." [Ref.
5:p. 13]
This close relationship between the Party and the
publishers of Morskoy Sbornik provided a known field for a
test of content via the proposed method. Other themes of
expected interest were also examined, as will be described
below.
Since the journals examined were originally published in
Russian, translations prepared by the Naval Intelligence
Command were used for analysis. Recognizing the difficulty
of using such translations, a large volume of material was
used for the study, assuming that the Law of Large Numbers
[Ref. 10:p. 118] would even out any inequities caused by
mistranslation. Recognizing that some filtering of the
content occurs in translating, or in deciding not to
translate some articles, an inquiry to the source of the
translations was made. Discussions with Mr. Herbert Rooney
of the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC-62, Transla-
tion Services) established that all articles which pertain
to warfighting techniques, strategy, and doctrine are
20
translated and published. Those left out pertain to minor
historical situations, literary, cultural, and admin-
istrative issues. Examples include book and cinema reviews,
discussions on such items as whether or not commanding
officers should receive a certificate for their service, and
a series on "The Navy on Postage Stamps." When a particular
untranslated article is found to have relevance after the
translation has been distributed, that article is issued as
an addendum to the issue.
B. TESTING FOR CONTENT
In examining Morskoy S b o r n i
k
, a three-year period from
1970 through 1972 was selected for study. Events of this
time are well known by now, and this period includes the
first world-wide Soviet naval exercise, the 24th Congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the publication
of Admiral Gorshkov's first major literary work known to the
West, "Navies in War and Peace."
A total of 160 subject areas (Appendix A) was picked for
analysis. These areas were selected to represent themes
common to naval writings in Morskoy Sbor nik and Voyennaya
M ' ysl , the Soviet General Staff journal. Major geographic
and political areas of the world are represented, as are
major oceans and various warfighting techniques. Data
pertaining to topics were collected in a binary form (that
is, either a topic was mentioned or it was not). No attempt
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was made to weight the value of a particular reference
within an article. Thus this method is more properly
described as a theme analysis as opposed to a formal content
analysis
.
As Manheim and Rich point out [Ref. 20: p. 158], another
difficulty encountered in this type of analysis is the
context or application of certain words or phrases. In
Soviet military writings, for example, the United States may
be referred to as a nation which once rebelled against
imperialism, as a one-time ally against Fascist Germany, or
as the imperialist organizer of NATO. In coding the
thematic references, a variety of reference types was
included. Rather than merely observing the mentions of
"imperialism," for example, the applications of that term,
such as "Encirclement by Imperialists," the "Imperialist
Threat to Peace," and the belief that "Imperialists Unleash
War," or might do so, were counted separately. References
were kept as exclusive of one another as possible; for
example, mention of a ballistic missile-carrying submarine
(SSBN) would be counted in that category only, not in both
SSBNs and SUBMARINES.
An advantage to such separation of terms is that the
topic or topics can be considered separately. Rather than
simply ignoring the contextual use of topics, however, this
actually aids in an objective analysis of the concerns of
the writer, in that disinformation can be eliminated from
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the analysis. For example, Admiral Gorshkov, in describing
the course of the war against Japan in World War II, states:
"Japan had gained control of the sea which permitted her
to carry out several amphibious operations in the first
stage of the war. In two months the Japanese occupied the
Philippine Islands, the Malacca Peninsula with the major
British port of Singapore, Indonesia, Burma, and many
islands in the Pacific Ocean. Japan seized the vast
economic resources of Southeast Asia. However, as a
result of the victories achieved on the Soviet-German
front, particularly in the Battle of Stalingrad, which
determined the turning point in the course of the entire
war and which was consolidated by subsequent victories of
the Soviet Army, already by 1943 the Japanese were
refraining from further offensive operations and had gone
over to a strategic defense." [Ref. 21:p. 9]
Despite any arguments which might be made as to the
contributions of Allied naval forces in the Pacific, Admiral
Gorshkov's statement reveals a concern for the memory of the
Great Patriotic War, Japan, Southeast Asia, amphibious
operations, and the Soviet Army. In this case, the author
was not advocating naval air power, as evidenced by its
exclusion from the discussion of the war against Japan.
In this case, Admiral Gorshkov's apparent intent was to
show how Soviet military might brought about the fall of the
Axis powers. Examination of topical references in this
manner reveals the concerns of the author without the
distraction of having to determine truth or falsehood of
statements. This latter determination must be approached on
a case-by-case basis, recalling Leites' comments on Soviet
considerations of truth and its impact. [Ref. 15:p. 9]
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Another area of difficulty which might be encountered is
that of geography, particularly as it relates to military
history. References to "the heroes of Moon Sound Archipel-
ago" again mean little to American readers, but to Soviets
they evoke memories of an amphibious battle fought over
islands in the Baltic. An extensive atlas of the Soviet
Union, or a reference such as the Great Encyclopedia of the
Soviet Union [Ref . 22] is recommended.
An associated difficulty is that some concepts common to
American readers, when translated directly, might not be
recognized. References to the Brezhnev Doctrine, for
example, will not be found in writings intended for Soviet
readership. However, the essence of that doctrine, i.e.,
that it is the duty of the Soviet Union to defend the gains
of Socialism, was a theme which could be tracked. Similar-
ly, the term "naval operations" is not used. Instead,
references are made to "combat operations at sea."
To assist in intercoder reliability, a list of commonly-
used words and phrases (Appendix B) has been included to
enabla continuity in further research.
C. DATA EXTRACTION
To reduce the textual material to a formatted data base,
a worksheet containing the desired fields (author's name,
rank, and source, plus 140 topics) was prepared and
reproduced in small quantity. A trial coding of a six-month
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period was made to determine the completeness of the topic
list. Based on this test, twenty additional topics were
selected. Although several topics in the original list did
not appear, they were left in the final topic set in the
event that they might appear in source materials from other
months .
This initial coding also served to even out the
"learning curve" associated with performance of a new
activity .
The initial coding revealed that one regular monthly
article, entitled "With the Ships and Units of the Fleet,"
had a consistent content which included reports on all the
fleets of the Soviet Navy, its flotillas, and service
academies. Items discussed in this series were of a
non-operational nature, dealing with unit and individual
awards. Since data was recorded in binary form, and all
fleets, flotillas, and units were mentioned on an equal
basis, this series had an overall levelling effect on the
data. For this reason the series was omitted from the final
data set.
For final coding, a revised worksheet was prepared and
reproduced. Each article in the 36 journals was read and
evaluated according to the worksheet. As with most research
of this type, this step was the most tedious, particularly
in view of the pedantic style of writing used in Morskov
Sbornik during the years studied.
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Those articles which had not been translated were
evaluated as best they could by title and extract in the
table of contents. In these cases, technical and historical
reference books provided many clues to the content of the
articles. A title such as "The LEMBIT Attacks" [Ref. 23]
means little by itself; however, the 1945 edition of Jane ' s
Fighting Ships tells that the LEMBIT was a Soviet attack
submarine which achieved fame in the Great Patriotic War.
Such additional research, as well as discussions with NISC
translators, enabled a more complete data base to be
assembled
.
After a number of worksheets had been completed, the
extracted data was input to a data file via a specially-
prepared input program. This program, which is described
below, greatly reduced the time for input from what would
have been needed for purely manual keying. For a long-term
research project, however, a computer terminal equipped with
a light pen for operator-to-screen input could reduce the
input time even more.
D. DATA PROCESSING
The volume of data collected required special
processing. With 997 cases of up to 166 entries each,
(title, author's name and rank, academic status, month and
year of publication, plus the 160 specific topics), over
165,000 items of data were possible. Manual sorting and
26
crosstabulation of the data were out of the question, so an
existing computer statistics program, SAS [Ref. 24], was
used for data processing.
To simplify data entry, a program written in Display
Management System (DMS) code was used. This program,
specifically prepared for this project, gives a full-screen
display of desired fields on the IBM 3278 terminal (Figure
1). Title, author's name, rank, and academic status, and
source of publication are alphanumeric entries, while
month, year, and the 160 variable inputs (which may range
from zero to 255) are strictly numeric. An option is
provided to assign a case number (000-999) and length
(000-255) to each article. Source code for this program,
which can be easily modified to suit one's specific
requirements, plus operating instructions for use on the IBM
370 mainframe computer, are included as Appendix C.
Once entered, the data were analysed using SAS. All
topics were initially sorted as to total frequency for all
readings, then broken down to provide a monthly rate of
mention. The SAS SORT, PLOT, and TABLES procedures provided
the most useful outputs for analysis. Although PR0C CHART
gave a graphic output, it was limited in its ability to
display the full 36-month period on a single graph.
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As an initial crosscheck of frequency, a monthly rate of
mention was computed by year for each topic. This provides
a quick indication of short-terra reference. Only those
trends indicated by numerous events, or those which were
explicit in their content, were considered for analysis.
E. INITIAL FINDINGS
Upon initial data sorting, it became obvious that
several of the selected themes had not occurred at any time
in the three-year study period, and that others had received
only sporadic attention. Reviewing this subset of topics
(Appendix D, Topics Recorded in Less Than 1% of Cases), it
is evident that some of them (such as Detente and Directed
Energy Weapons) were not timely during the period studied.
Some geographic areas, such as the Middle East and the
Caribbean, were barely mentioned, apparently because of the
editors' concern in other areas. The Koreas are mentioned
primarily in regard to United States intervention against
North Korea during the Korean War, but the current (at that
time) conflict in Vietnam dominated interest in that part of
the world
.
Several topics dealing with warfighting techniques were
conspicuously absent. Camouflage, Biological and Chemical
Warfare, Maximum Use of Power, and Surprise had all received
attention in the General Staff journal ( Voyennaya M'ysl )
used in compiling the original list of topics, but received
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no mention in Morskoy Sbornik . Similarly, topics dealing
with the Strategic Missions of the Armed Forces and the Navy
were either infrequent or completely absent. Apparently the
editors (or their superiors in the Main Political
Administration) do not wish to discuss such items in a
publication intended for general circulation.
Another curious absence was any reference to Nazis.
Fascism and "Hitlerites" are discussed frequently,
particularly in the context of the Great Patriotic War and
Defense of the Motherland, but the term Nazi is either
missing, or consistently mistranslated. This latter
possibility is unlikely (the Russian word for Nazi is
Natsist , and should be clearly recognized by a linguist), so
it appears that the concept of the Great Patriotic War being
the result of a political entity, particularly one calling
itself the "National Socialist Party," is not acceptable.
To label the war the result of Fascists, who are the
political descendants of imperialists, is more in keeping
with Leninist doctrine.
On the other end of the spectrum, three topics received
the degree of attention which was expected.
The first of these, the Great Patriotic War of the
Soviet Union, is an element of any Soviet publication
dealing with the Soviet military or the history of the
Soviet Union. In this case, the Great Patriotic War was
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shows, an irregular rate of mention is evident over the
36-month period. It is this irregularity which clearly
demonstrates a degree of control over the content of Morskoy
Sbornik .
Rather than displaying random references to the war,
Figure 2 shows a peak of interest in month 5, which is May,
1970. This month marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
defeat of Nazi Germany, and the May, 1970 journal was filled
with references to that defeat.
The second twelve-month period of the same figure shows
a cyclic pattern of quarterly interest in the war, again
with a peak in May. By 1972, mentions of the war have
levelled out somewhat, but again no month has more
references to the war than May.
The second topic frequently mentioned reveals the truly
political nature of this journal. As was previously stated,
Morskoy Sbornik is published under the auspices of the Main
Political Administration of the Army and Navy, which
receives its direction from the Central Committee. Thus it
should follow that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
would receive attention through this publication. As Figure
3 shows, this is clearly the case. Although references vary
considerably in 1970, steady attention is given in 1971,
with a peak in September of that year. Not surprisingly,
September, 1971 marked the meeting of the 24th Congress of






























By examining these two themes, it can clearly be seen
that strong editorship controls the content of articles
published in Morskoy Sbornik . With this established, other
trends can be examined in search of their significance.
The third topic receiving most frequent mention was
Training. It would be expected that a professional naval
journal like Morskoy Sbornik t which is intended for the
readership of young military officers, and which is a means
for dissemination of Party policy, must devote a
considerable portion of its content to training matters.
The Soviet Officer ' s Handbook puts it explicitly:
"The training of servicemen ... is organized and
conducted in accordance with the policy of the Communist
Party and the Soviet government on the basis of
present-day military doctrine, orders of the Minister of
Defense, military regulations, instructions and programs
of combat and political training.
"Its main task is to ensure a high state of constant
combat readiness of units, ships and formations, and their
ability to crush any aggressor who dares to disrupt the
peaceful creative labor of our people." [Ref. 5:p. 88]
Figure 4 reveals a fairly steady rate of mention (more
so than the previous two topics, which had specific events
to weight them). By plotting the references to training on
a yearly basis, however, an interesting pattern emerges.
Again, rather than the apparent random mentions seen in
Figure 4, Figure 5 shows a cyclic, although imperfect,
pattern. What can be stated on the basis of this graph is
that training receives high emphasis at the beginning of the





















































































point in May (perhaps due to emphasis on historical events),
reaches a high point between August and October, and
diminishes again in the last quarter. If the August, 1970
peak is rejected as an outlier, then April, June, and
October are shown as times of emphasis in training.
While this conclusion might at first seem suspect, it is
supported by the data on Readiness, which, as the previous
quotation shows, is considered a product of "training by the
Soviets. While the long-term stability of references to
readiness (Figure 6) is not as stable as that of training,
the two do show some parallels (Figure 7). Again, it is the
yearly breakdown which is most revealing; as Figure 8 shows,
May of each year had zero references (akin to the May low
point for training), while April and June are relatively
high points (again with a single outlier).
In addition to being supported by other data from the
same analysis technique, the cycle described also coincides
with the Soviet Army's conscription and training cycle,
which brings new recruits into the service in January,
trains them for primary exercises in the spring, relaxes for
the month of victory celebrations in May, then builds up to
a major exercise in the autumn, after the harvest has been
collected .
Having demonstrated that thematic measurement of topics
can provide an insight to editorial concerns, the next
chapter contains specific evaluation of common topics.
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III. EVALUATION OF DATA
The large number of themes studied provided a wide range
of recorded frequencies, from zero (as shown in Appendix D)
to a high of 184 in the case of the Great Patriotic War of
the Soviet Union, meaning that this war was mentioned in
18.4% of all the articles screened. A tabulation of themes
vs. frequency is provided in Appendix E.
In this chapter, selected topics dealing with political,
geographic, and military fields will be examined. The
ability of the methodology being evaluated to alert the
analyst to changes in emphasis, and to cue the observer to
unusual occurrences will be shown.
A. POLITICAL TOPICS
The personalities of political leaders in the Soviet
Union are as varied as the lands they come from. V. I.
Lenin, who was of mixed Russian-German blood, cannot be
equated with Nikita Khrushchev, a Great Russian raised in
the Ukraine. Likewise Josef Stalin, a Georgian, was
different from the leaders of the present government.
An even more sensitive element is that of political
acceptance by the rulers at any given time. Stalin, as was
shown in Chapter 1, was the only source of Soviet doctrine
during his rule. However, following his death and
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denunciation by Khrushchev in 1956 [Ref. 25:p. 572], Stalin
was no longer a suitable source for political guidance.
Distaste for his memory even called for removal of his body
from Lenin's Tomb, where it had lain since his death.
Journalistic references can provide a clue to the
propriety of certain topics. As has been stated, for
example, the Nazi Party of Hitler's Germany is taboo in
certain contexts, although Hitler himself can be discussed.
An analysis of references to past leaders of the Soviet
Union is similarly enlightening.
As the founder of the Soviet state, and the only member
of the Soviet political "trinity" (where he appears with
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels) to have any Russian blood,
V. I. Lenin is singularly revered in the U.S.S.R. His tomb
in Red Square in Moscow is a mecca to Communists, and his
prolific writings are used to provide legitimacy to national
policy. Figure 9 shows what, at first look, is an irregular
rate of reference to Lenin, but this is nonetheless reveal-
ing. The strong peak in April, 1970 far surpasses that of
any other personality examined, and stems from the celebra-
tion of the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth that month.
Overlaying the references to display a yearly cycle
(Figure 10) shows peaks each April, with a secondary peak in
February. This secondary peak coincides with the annual
celebration of the Day of the Soviet Armed Forces, marking
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Going on to Lenin's successor, it appears that memories
of Stalin's rule were strong enough during the three years
studied to prevent his mention, despite the 25th anniversary
of the end of the Great Patriotic War. His name did occur
once, in December 1971, but only in reference to an
icebreaker named after him.
Reappearance of references to a personality such as
Stalin, as occurred in the later 1970s, could indicate
significant changes in Soviet policy. Leonid Brezhnev's
"rehabilitation" of Stalin caused great concern in the West,
as would Western revisionism of Hitler's deeds.
Nikita Khrushchev did not even receive as much attention
as Stalin, being completely absent from any mention in the
period studied. Given his dislike of naval forces, the
naval authors of Morskoy Sbornik probably feel no obligation
to preserve his memory, and the Party leadership did not see
fit to keep his memory alive.
Early results of this study indicated that Leonid
Brezhnev would similarly be excluded from mention, with no
mention of him at all in 1970 and only a single reference in
the first half of 1971. Beginning in July of that year,
however, and coincidental with preparations for the 24th
Party Congress, frequent references established Brezhnev as
a common fixture to Morskoy Sbornik . Only after Brezhnev
had been established as the Party spokesman to the Navy did





























Socialism," known to the West as the Brezhnev Doctrine and
established at the 24th Party Congress, appear (Figure 11).
Departing from discussions of persons, a study of
political organizations reveals deliberate variance of
frequency of mention over time. As was shown in the last
chapter, the driving force behind the Soviet government and
military, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, received
special treatment in Morskoy Sbornik before and during the
24th Party Congress. Another organization, the Communist
Youth League, Komsomol (Figure 12), does not show the steady
climb and fall shown by the CPSU in Figure 3, but rather
shows an obvious absence in 1970 followed by more regular
mention in 1971 and in 1972, the year of the fiftieth
anniversary of Komsomol sponsorship of the Soviet Navy.
From a mere three mentions in 1970, frequency climbs to 27
in 1971 and holds relatively constant at 26 in 1972.
The low frequency of mention in 1970, coupled with the
relatively static number of references during the
anniversary year of 1972, seems to indicate that no specific
effort is made to ensure attention to this organization.
Although the majority of Soviet sailors (80%) are Komsomol
members, only 20% of officers belong [Ref. 2:p. 277], due in
part to the greater age of officers, who have likely become
Communist Party members. It appears that Morskoy Sbornik is













The antithesis of Communism, Fascism, receives slightly
more attention than the Komsomol over the three-year period,
with an average monthly mention of 1.72 and a mode of 2.
The greatest deviation from this mode, as shown in Figure
13, begins in May, 1971 and ends in May, 1972. This
coincides with a deviation in the frequency pattern of a
topic the Soviets closely associate with Fascism, the
defense of the Soviet motherland (Figure 14). Referring
back to Figure 3, it can be seen that this period equates to
the time of highest reference to the Communist Party, which
had been brought about by the 24th Party Congress in 1971.
As was said, this congress first introduced the policy of
the defense of the gains of Socialism (the Brezhnev
Doctrine), and invocation of past enemies (Fascists) and the
need for preservation of the Socialist motherland support
this policy .
It can be seen that several themes may be interrelated.
A more complete data set, such as could be compiled if all
the published articles had been translated and made
available for evaluation, could better reveal these
interrelations using factor analysis.
B. OCEAN AREAS
Any discussion of a Navy journal must touch on the
subject of the world's oceans. Trends displayed by data
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prior examples, but some concerns are nevertheless revealed.
The relative frequencies of mention among the oceans, as
percentages of total ocean/fleet references, are shown in
Figure 15.
Among those areas which show little variation over the
study period, the Atlantic Ocean and the Black Sea (Figures
16 and 17) are most consistent. The Mediterranean (Figure
18) shows annual increases, reflecting the increasing Soviet
concern shown by their increased presence there (Ref. 26].
Although the number of ship-days the Fifth Eskadra spent in
the Mediterranean dropped slightly in 1972, awareness of the
area, as seen in Figure 18, did not diminish.
The Baltic Sea (Figure 19) shows an interesting increase
in frequency from May, 1971 to April, 1972, again roughly
corresponding to peaks seen with the Communist Party,
defense of the Motherland, and Fascism. Rereading the
articles in which the Baltic was mentioned, it was seen that
several of the references dealt with Naval preparations
forthe 24th Party Congress, particularly with the cruiser
AVRORA, a relic of the October Revolution which was the
first ship to fire on the Winter Palace.
The ability of binary thematic content analysis to point
out peculiarities in data, as seen here, serves as a tipoff
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Interestingly, the Baltic Sea and Baltic Fleet received
more mentions than any other ocean and fleet. Explanation
of this is due in part to the fact that many of the
contributors to Morskoy Sbornik are from the Soviet military
academies, which are concentrated around Leningrad on the
Baltic .
The Indian Ocean received relatively few mentions over
the 36 months studied (18 total, or inclusion in less than 2
per cent of all articles), but these reveal an increasing
need for awareness of the area. The only mention in 1970,
dealt with the "International Legal Regime of the Coastal
Waters of the Indian Ocean" [Ref. 27], a description of
rules for safe navigation in this area. Figure 20 shows a
substantial increase in 1971, including articles which deal
more directly with U.S. involvement there. One of these,
"The Pentagon Fills the 'Vacuum'" [Ref. 28], gives a
description of the planned naval construction at Diego
Garcia, two years before the first U.S. facility there was
commissioned
.
The increased attention to the Indian Ocean shown in
Morskoy Sbornik was shown in more concrete terms the
folio wing year, when Soviet Navy ship-days there more than
doubled (approximately 9,000 ship-days in 1972, compared
with 4,000 in 1971) [Ref. 26: P . 43].
Sometimes the presence of a single peak signifies a













































































































































and the Communist Party (Figures 2 and 3). However, in the
case of the Pacific Ocean (Figure 21), the peak in August
1972 is inconsistent with any other data concerning Soviet
naval activities. Removing it as an outlier for further
analysis, 1971 and 1972 have monthly averages of 2.17 and
1.72, well within one standard deviation (1.2605) of the
mean for those two years. This implies that little
variation occurred after 1970, a fact which is borne out by
the recorded stabilization of Pacific Fleet size following
1971 [Ref. 26:p. 84].
The North Sea/North Fleet data also showed a confusing
rise in references during 1971 (Figure 22), this time over a
longer period of time. In this case, as in that of the
Baltic, review of identified articles showed that most of
the increase was due to the preparation for the 24th Party
Congress. This close association of the Baltic and North
fleets with the Communist Party suggests strong ties between
these fleets and the physical defense of the Soviet Union.
C. WARFIGHTING TECHNIQUES
No other topics dealing with warfighting receive as much
attention as do submarines and antisubmarine warfare.
Admiral Gorshkov's faith in the submarine as a combat
platform has been well reported over the years, and in
addressing the improvement of naval forces and equipment,
submarines are his first priority [Ref. 29:p. 239]. For
62
this study, submarines were categorized as either attack, or
nuclear-powered ballistic missile-firing submarines. While
this excludes the early diesel-powered ballistic missile
subs, preliminary study had shown such references to be
extremely rare.
The first category is mentioned at least once 35 out of
36 times (Figure 23), and shows an overall increase in
frequency. September, 1971 had the highest frequency of
mention, and that issue had eight articles specifically
dealing with submarines, showing a deliberate effort to
bring them to the readers' attention. The next-highest
month, May of that year, had only four specific articles,
the rest of the mentions being in articles concerned
primarily with other topics.
References to SSBNs were more erratic, with 11 months
containing no reference to them at all (Figure 24). Many of
the references which did occur were to American missile
submarines and the threat they posed to Soviet freedoms.
The combined values for submarines and SSBMs, shown in
Figure 25, show a period of increased attention beginning in
early 1971 and continuing through most of 1972. This period
coincides with a period of increased concern with
antisubmarine warfare shown in Figure 26. As can be seen,
beginning in 1971 no month went by without at least one
reference to ASW. Talk of hunting "enemy" submarines,
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increased. The increased attention paid to ASW in Morskoy
Sbornik presaged the 1973 arrival of modified Kashin-class
guided-missile destroyers, which had been refitted with more
capable submarine detection gear.
The peak in discussion of ASW occurs in November, 1971,
and although several of the designated articles that month
dealt with historical cases, one deserves special comment.
"'Baby' Hunter-Killer Submarines in the Aggressive Plans of
the American Militarists" [Ref. 30] describes the intent of
Western navies to use small, high-speed attack submarines
for ASW. Interestingly, this article describes a submarine
unlike any on the American drawing boards, but quite close
to the Soviet Alpha class launched in 1972. Thus the
mirror-imaging described in Chapter 1 may occur on the part
of the Soviets as well. Another incidence of this is shown
in Soviet descriptions of a massive aircraft, called the
ekranoplan (called the wing-in-ground effect, or WIGE
vehicle in the West), which the Soviets claim Western armed
forces plan to use for ASW and amphibious operations.
Although no Western navy or air force had seriously
considered building such a vehicle, a March, 1971 article
entitled "The Development of Landing Forces" [Ref. 31] gave
specifications which, it was said, would be used by Western
forces. Upon analysis, the measurements and capabilities
described are actually those of a Soviet prototype WIGE
vehicle [Ref. 32].
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The last topic dealing with submarines, that of submarine
accidents, was of very low frequency (only 10 mentions in
three years, as shown in Figure 27). However, it is
interesting to note that all the references were to U.S. or
allied submarine accidents, never to Soviet cases. Although
the alleged shortcomings of U.S. submarines were discussed
on roughly a quarterly basis, an interesting gap occurs
following the February, 1970 mention which detailed the U.S.
losses of the Thresher and Scorpion [Ref. 33]. Two months
after that article appeared, a Soviet November-class nuclear
attack submarine sank in the Atlantic, and it was not until
October that the topic of submarine accidents (On the Safety
of Nuclear-Powered Ships," [Ref. 34]) appeared, this time
describing the reportedly unsafe conditions aboard U.S.
nuclear submarines.
Amphibious operations (Figure 28) showed an overall,
though sporadic increase. This increase represents a trend
begun in the 1960s [Ref. 35:p. 176] which is shown in the
Soviet rehearsal for amphibious warfare in their major
exercises. Although the Soviet fear of a U.S. invasion in
the 1950s (a capability demonstrated at Normandy) never
materialized, and was replaced in priority first by the
threat of attacks by naval air power (as demonstrated in the
Korean War) and then by concern over American ballistic

























































capabilities for counter-amphibious warfare and offensive
amphibious operations were still maintained.
Although references to aircraft (Figure 29) appear
sporadic at first glance, it can be seen that the surge in
references from May to August of 1971 brings about an
overall change in frequency, as well as relative stability
of that frequency. The surge in references in those months
was not due to specific articles about aircraft, but rather
an increasing acceptance of them as a topic for discussion
when dealing with other subjects.
Following this acceptance of aircraft, discussion of
aircraft carriers (always U.S. or allied carriers, since the
Soviets had only the Moskva -class helicopter carrier
operational at this time) increased (Figure 30). Ranft and
Till point out that aircraft carriers had first won real
acceptance in 1969, when it was realized that they could be
effective in local war situations [Ref. 35:p. 104],
The final area which will be discussed in this chapter,
nuclear energy, was studied in three aspects: nuclear
propulsion, nuclear weapons, and nuclear warfare.
Although Figure 31 shows an increase in references to
nuclear propulsion in late 1971 and the first half of 1972,
review of the articles containing these references shows
that the mentions stem from description of the high
readiness of the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet in
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A few mentions are made of the particular difficulties of
working with nuclear power (see Figure 27, Submarine
Accidents), but in general Figure 31 shows what would have
been recorded by a plot of references to nuclear-powered
attack submarines (SSNs, as opposed to ballistic
missile-carrying SSBNs shown in Figure 24).
Nuclear weapons (Figure 32) receive more attention than
propulsion, particularly in the months preceeding the 24th
Party Congress. This association is reflected in another
political theme, that of the Imperialists (meaning the
United States and its allies) "unleashing" a war on the
Soviet Union (Figure 33).
Surprisingly, although nuclear weapons are mentioned on
a somewhat regular basis, nuclear warfare is not (Figure
34). The peak references do coincide with those to nuclear
weapons, but the overall level is much lower. This is
probably due to the fact that Morskoy Sbornik is not a
source of official doctrine, but rather is a Communist Party
channel for dissemination of ideology to naval officers. A
more substantial measurement of policy could be gained from
a study of Voyennaya M'ysl, the General Staff journal, but
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D. UTILIZATION OF RESULTS
It has been shown that even an unclassified magazine
like Morskoy Sbornik can provide a "tipoff" to some
occurrences and trends in the Soviet Navy, or can
substantiate other data. The use of such data varies
according to the needs of any given analyst, but what is
most essential is to provide the information as it is
needed. As in many cases of data collection, the cycle of
collection, production, and dissemination of an intelligence
product breaks down after the production has been completed.
The next chapter will address recommendations for
institution of this methodology and the products it could
provide in a format which could make them readily available
for those who have a proven need for such data.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE OF A THEMATIC DATA BASE
The primary effort in the experiment described above was the
design and compilation of a data base, which was then
available for statistical analysis and evaluation. Many
interpretations of the raw data could be made, and for this
reason themes not specifically addressed in the previous
chapters have been included as Appendix F.
The topics chosen for research varied greatly in their
frequency of mention, indicating that the source document,
Morskoy Sbornik
, does not cover all those topics to the
extent desired by an analyst. For extended research, a
final topic set should include more than the 160 themes used
in this case, perhaps categorizing weapon systems by type,
and separating geographical areas more precisely. Summation
of subsets from the total list is a relatively easy step
once the data base is in a computer-readable format.
Another area of high interest, and of which Morskoy
Sbornik and similar journals are excellent sources, is
biographic and career information concerning Soviet military
officers. Although records on the career histories of some
prominent foreign military officials are kept, such
compilations are often published on an irregular basis, and
as a result information contained in them may be outdated.




was last published in 1976 and at the time of
this writing was nine years old.
A. LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING DATA BASES
The problem with that document, and others like it, is
that minor changes or updates do not justify the cost of
replacing an entire book. In an era of paper and ink data
sources, this was easily understood. Recent technological
changes, however, have provided some researchers,
particularly users of intelligence data, with alternatives
in the forms of the Community On-Line Intelligence Network
System (COINS) and the Defense Data Network.
COINS provides secure transmission of information from a
central storage point to authorized users, and is intended
for classified information. The Defense Data Network (DDN),
a part of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Network (ARPANET), permits transmission and storage of
unclassified material only. The data base developed for
this thesis, for example, could have been stored on the DDN.
Existence of such a data base, in a format accessible to
authorized users (who could gain access by use of controlled
passwords) would enable researchers to examine themes over
time, and to locate minor references to specific topics much
more easily than can be done using current methods. The
primary unclassified source of references to defense-related




records only primary subjects of each article
screened for inclusion and is again produced in a hard-copy
(paper) format requiring manual examination.
The data base prepared for this thesis was prepared at
minimal expense using existing assets at the Naval
Postgraduate School. Software development for the project
was done locally, at no additional expense. The primary
element consumed was manpower for data extraction and entry,
which was done in addition to a regular academic schedule
over a four-month period. Once the data entry program had
been developed, scanning of journals and data entry averaged
approximately one hour per issue. If applied to an
institutionalized product, this methodology could make a
great deal of information available to researchers at a very
low cost
.
B. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DATA BASE DESIGN
For implementation as a regular product, the following
recommendations are made to the experimental data base:
1 . Size of Data Set
Expand the topic set to include ship, aircraft, and
weapon types. The limit of 160 categories was based on the
configuration of the IBM 3278 terminals available and the
design option which included numerical values of up to 255
for each value in the data entry phase. If only binary
values were used, or if a full 80-column display is
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available, a single-screen entry template could accommodate
up to 260 variable fields. Use of multiple screens would
allow any topic set to be used.
2 . Biographical Data
Include references to personalities. A specific
block of variable fields could be allocated for this use,
and the career paths of individuals could be reconstructed
much more easily than is currently possible.
3 . Multiple Sources
Incorporate additional sources of data if they can
be obtained on a regular basis. The Soviet Military Review
,
for example, although primarily oriented toward the Army,
does occasionally address naval topics. Declassified





valuable information. However, missing editions would
seriously affect analysis of the type presented here.
Missing volumes would have to be accounted for via data
averaging or rejection of those months.
C. CONCLUSIONS
In sum, the creation and maintenance of a thematic data
base, extracted from multiple sources and maintained in an
on-line electronic format, would have applications in
military intelligence. No such information presently exists
in a form readily available for exploitation via computer-
ized data processing. Existing assets could be used to
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prepare such a data base, which would be more complete and
accessable than any present source. Such a product could
provide more timely information than current dissemination
methods
.
A full estimate of costs, considering the translator/
analyst man-hours, software development, and recurring cost
of data entry, as well as system maintenance has not been
calculated, but these costs are in many cases parallel to
current expenditures. The effort expended in developing
such a system would be likely outweighed by the man-hours
saved in searching the same data sources manually, and
serious consideration should be given to incorporation of
such a data base on existing data networks.
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APPENDIX A




































Defense of the Motherland
Destruction of Civilization




































































































































Political Nature of War
Preemptive Nuclear Strikes (Soviet)
Preemptive Nuclear Strikes (U.S.)
Propulsion Systems (Conventional, Naval)

















Strategic Missions of Armed Forces









Theatres of Military Operations (TVDs)
Theatres of Naval Operations
Torpedoes
Training































Any country in that area
Morale




Combat operations at sea
Oceanology
Patriotic duties
Any country in that area
Any country in that area
Satellites and space
systems
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The following figures provide rates of mention for
topics not specifically addressed in the data analysis
portion of this thesis. They represent those topics which
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